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Richard Bruce Kishpaughf Defendant-Appellant (Kishpaugh), 
by and through his attorneys of record/ pursuant to Rule 24(c) 
and Rule 27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby submits 
his Repy Brief in response to certain new matters raised in 
William A Kornmayer's and Kathryn Kornmayer's (Petitioners), 
Respondents f Br ief. 
SCOPE OF ARGUMENT 
This Reply Brief will cover only certain new matters 
raised in Respondents' Brief; viz,, Substantial compliance 
with the Hutchinson standing will not support a conclusion of 
rebuttal of the parental presumption; B, Brian's express 
preference cannot support an award of custody; C. Petitioners 
correctly point out Kishpaugh has been effectively divested of 
his right ever to obtain custody of Brian; and D. Petitioners 
erroneously conclude Kishpaugh intentionally misled the Court, 
ARGUMENT 
A, SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE HUTCHINSON STANDARD 
DOES NOT SUPPORT A CONCLUSION OF REBUTTAL OF THE PARENTAL 
PRESUMPTION. 
Petitioners •agrue the trial court was in "substantial 
compliance" with the Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 
1982), standard in basing its conclusion that the parental 
presumption had been rebutted on a finding Kishpaugh lacked two 
of the three characteristics listed as elements of the three-
pronged Hutchinson test, (Respondents1 Brief at 5), The 
Hutchinson standard does not call for "substitutional compliance" 
or "two out of three". Hutchinson states "all three of the 
characteristics that give rise to the [parental] presumption" 
must be missing. 649 P.2d at 41; Cooper v. Deland, 652 P.2d at 
908. 
The standard actually applied by the trial court was not 
even in "substantial compliance" with Hutchinson. At the 
beginning of the trial, the court stated: 
THE COURT: Well, lets not argue. I'm not going to 
argue it right now. I'm going to look in this case as 
the issue of one, I guess there is a presumption that 
the nature parents should have the child. 
MR. HAYES: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Assume that's the case, the good Lord 
gave it to them, why should I be involved in changing 
that. Two, then I've got to look at the next thing 
which is assuming both sides are equally competent, 
equally capable, equally reliable in taking care of the 
child; without any evidence of one side having some 
pluses or minuses insofar as the child is concerned. 
Then I've got to look at what is the child's best 
interest, what would the child like to do, where would 
the child be best and what would be for the best 
interests of the child. Who can best take care of this 
child. And I think that when I get through with the 
whole thing that's the kind of position, who can best 
take care of this child. Now, I'm going to kind of 
restrict to that area. Okay? 
(T 9-10) 
Later, in its memorandum decision, the trial court is 
silent on the question of whether the parental presumption had 
been rebutted. As to the standard actually applied, it stated: 
^ 
The real issue in this case is what is for the 
best interest of Brian (see Cooper v. Delandf 652 
P. 2d 907 and Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 
38). After much consideration, this court 
concludes that it is for the best interest of Brian 
that Mr. and Mrs. William Kornmayer be granted 
custody of Brian for the present time. 
(Respondents1 Brief, Appendix B, at 2-3) 
B. BRIAN'S EXPRESS PREFERENCE CANNOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF 
CUSTODY TO PETITIONERS. 
Petitioners have made much of Brian's express preference 
to continue to live with Petitioners and Ona Landrum. From a 
finding thereof by the trial court (F.F. 9) , Petitioners have 
inferred both that the parental presumption had been rebutted, 
that Brian's best interests favor awarding custody to Petitioners 
(Respondents' Brief at 4-5), and that Kishpaugh should never be 
awarded custody of Brian (Respondents' Brief at 9). 
Too much is made of this expression of preference. 
Brian has lived with Ona Landrum and Petitioners since the 
divorce in 1981. He was then five years old. Since that time he 
has lived with Ona Landrum in her home during the week and with 
Petitioners in their trailer on the weekends. For four years 
Brain saw his mother and father only on visits: his father more 
frequently than his mother. 
It comes as no surprise that Brian, or any other eight 
and one-half year old boy, would express a preference for living 
where he has lived the past four years. Even though it is clear 
that Brian loves his father very much and has established a home 
of sorts in Reno (Respondents' Brief, Appendix Ef at 1-3), he 
prefers to live where he has lived. 
This preference should not be wholly determinative. 
Plaintiff's preference placed Brian in Ona Landrum's home, not 
Brian's. Plaintiff's preference kept him there for four years. 
Naturally Brian developed a preference for the place he has lived 
half of his young life. This preference does not indicate that 
Kishpaugh lacks typical parental characteristics, that Brian's 
best interests are best served by his remaining with Petitioners 
or that Kishpaugh should never obtain custody. This preference 
indicates only Brian's normal attachment to the familiar. 
C. PETITIONERS CORRECTLY POINT OUT KISHPAUGH HAS BEEN 
EFFECTIVELY DIVESTED OF HIS RIGHT EVER TO OBTAIN CUSTODY OF 
BRIAN. 
Petitioners point out in response to point C of 
Kishpaugh's argument (Appellants' Brief at 8-10): 
It would be a great hardship for Brian if 
custody was to be changed at a later date because 
the Defendant had somehow "redeemed" himself, for 
example, by visiting and writing more often, and by 
paying his child support. None of those things 
change the fact that the longer Brian stays with 
the Petitioners, the more bonded be will become, 
and the more difficult it would be for him to leave 
his home and friends. [Emphasis added] 
(Respondents' Brief at 9). 
The very wrong Kishpaugh complains of the Petitioners 
admit to. In large part, the trial court based its decision on 
the fact that Brian has lived with Petitioners for four years, 
(T 135) and upon Brian's express preference, as noted above. 
These matters are outside Kishpaugh's control and, as Petitioners 
stated, "the longer Brian stays with the Petitioners, the more 
bonded he will become", and the less likely Kishpaugh will ever 
be able to acquire custody. Thus, under the standard apparently 
followed by the trial court, nothing Kishpaugh can ever do will 
enable him to regain custody of Brian. 
D. PETITIONERS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE KISHPAUGH 
INTENTIONALLY MISLED THIS COURT. 
Petitioner pointed out (Respondents' Brief at 10), that 
in Kishpaugh's Brief, it states incorrectly that the trial court 
in Cooper v. DeLand, 652 P. 2d 902 (Utah 1982) awarded custody of 
an eight year old to the stepfather upon petition for custody by 
the noncustodial natural father following the death of the 
natural mother. (Appellant's Brief at 4). 
Petitioners argue that Kishpaugh, thus, "attempts to 
wilfully mislead the Court as [sic] the disposition of [Cooper]" 
(Respondents' Brief at 10). This is not the case. Kishpaugh 
cites Cooper to support his proposition that the Hutchinson 
standard applies in custody disputes between parents and 
nonparents. In Cooper the trial court erred in applying an 
-A_ 
incorrect legal standard, much as the trial court in the instant 
case has erred. 
Any errors in Kishpaugh's Brief are those of his 
counsel. They are not intended to mislead this Court, but are 
only the result of Kishpaugh's counsel's unfortunate misreading 
of the facts of Cooper. A copy of the Cooper decision is 
attached as Appendix D. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial compliance with the Hutchinson standard will 
not support a conclusion of rebuttal of the parental presumption. 
The standard requires all three characteristics to be missing, 
not merely two of three. The trial court erred in concluding 
otherwise. Second, Brian's preference is but one factor to be 
considered among many in establishing his "best interests". 
Third, Petitioners have agreed Kishpaugh has been effectively 
divested of his right ever to obtain custody of Brian and Brian 
has been effectively divested of his right to be raised by this 
natural parent. This was error. 
Respectfully Submitted this ^>i day of ^ 7 ^ ' 
\ ^ 
1985. 
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHARREN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By; —<S^\v /^vt^3M^v^\ - ^ y u v u , 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the 3/ day of /^/, 
1985, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief were 
served upon Jane Allen, Attorney for Respondents, at 73 5 Judge 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
APPENDIX "D" 
COOPER 
Cite as, Utal 
safety of others by driving erratically and 
on the wrong side of the traffic divider in 
his efforts to elude pursuers. We therefore 
hold that substantial evidence supported 
the jury in finding that the state had estab-
lished both the act and the intent compo-
nents of attempted first degree murder by 
defendant. 
[4] The instructions to the jury correct-
ly described the elements of attempted first 
degree murder and defined the terms "in-
tentionally" and "knowingly" in precisely 
the language used by the Utah Criminal 
Code.9 The instructions also correctly stat-
ed: 
You are instructed that in every crime 
or public offense there must be a union or 
joint operation of the act and intent. 
The intent or intention is manifested by 
the circumstances connected with the of-
fense and the sound'mind and discretion 
of the accused. 
All presumptions of law, independent 
of evidence, are in favor of innocence, 
and a defendant is innocent until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
And in case of a reasonable doubt as to 
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to be found not guilty. 
Having received proper instruction con-
cerning the act and intent requirements for 
the crime charged and the applicable stan-
dard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
lay within the province of the jury to decide 
the factual question of whether the state 
had met this standard of proof. Because 
substantial evidence supported the jury's 
guilty verdict, the trial court erred in inter-
fering with the jury's exercise of its fact-
finding role. We order that the verdict be 
reinstated. 
Reversed. 
STEWART, OAKS and HOWE, JJ„ and 
DAVID B. DEE, District Judge, concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate here-
in; DEE, District Judge, sat. 
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Michael J. COOPER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Walter DeLAND, Richard Vigor, et aL, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 18101. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 26. &82. 
Natural father of minor child brought 
action against minor's maternal grandpar-
ents, maternal uncles and aunts, and stepfa-
ther, seeking appointment as guardian of 
the minor. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered 
judgment in favor of natural father, and 
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held 
that case had to be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to enter findings on 
whether parental presumption had been 
overcome and on the best interests of the 
child. 
Remanded. 
1. Parent and Child <s=»2(8) 
Presumption that child's best interests 
are most adequately served by granting 
custody to natural parent is not conclusive. 
2. Parent and Child <s=>2(3.1, 8) 
Party seeking to deprive a natural par-
ent of custody of a minor child can rebut 
parental presumption only by evidence es-
tablishing that no strong mutual bond ex-
ists, that the parent has not demonstrated a 
willingness to sacrifice his or her own inter-
est and welfare for the child's interest and 
welfare, and that the parent lacks the sym-
pathy for and understanding of the child 
that is characteristic of parents generally; 
only after parental presumption has been 
rebutted, will parties compete on equal 
9. U C A , 1953, 76-2-103(1), (2). 
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footing, and custody shall then be granted 
to party who will most adequately protect 
and promote the best interests of the child. 
3. Parent and Child <s=>2(20) 
Custody dispute between minor child's 
natural father and stepfather had to be 
remanded to trial court with instructions to 
enter findings on whether parental pre-
sumption had been overcome and on the 
best interests of the child. 
David S. Dolowitz of Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
appellants. 
Phil L. Hansen of Hansen & Hansen, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case involves a custody dispute be-
tween a minor chiJd's natura) father and 
stepfather. 
Plaintiff-respondent, Michael J. Cooper, is 
the natural father of a minor child, born 
July 22, 1973, as the issue of his marriage 
with Lisa DeLand. The marriage terminat-
ed in divorce in 1975, and Lisa DeLand was 
granted custody of the minor child. Lisa 
DeLand married the defendant-appellant, 
Richard Vigor, on July 24, 1980. Lisa De-
Land Vigor died on October 13, 1980. The 
respondent initiated this action against the 
minor's maternal grandparents, maternal 
uncles and aunts, and appellant, seeking 
custody of his son. The defendants filed a 
counterclaim, seeking to have the appellant 
appointed as the guardian of the minor. 
The trial court determined that neither 
the appellant nor the respondent was unfit 
to have custody of the minor child. How-
ever, the court ruled that the appellant had 
failed to show, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that it was not in the best interests 
of the minor to be placed in the custody of 
his natural father. Thus, the trial court 
granted custody to the minor's natural fa-
ther, with an order that the minor's mater-
nal grandparents be granted reasonable vis-
itation privileges. On appeal, the appellant 
alleges that the trial court erred when it 
required the defendants to meet the "clear 
and convincing evidence" standard set out 
in In re Castillo, Utah, 632 P.2d 855 (1981). 
This Court stated in Castillo that a party 
seeking to deprive the natural parent of his 
parental rights must prove by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that it is not in the 
best interests of the child to reside with his 
natural parent. Id. at 857. Appellant 
claims that since the present case involves a 
custody dispute rather than a permanent 
termination of parental rights, the Castillo 
standard does not apply here. 
After this appeal was filed, this Court 
refined the standard adopted in Castillo in 
regard to cases involving permanent termi-
nation of all parental rights. In In re J.P., 
Utah, 648 P.2d 1364 (1982), we stated that 
before a natural parent can be permanently 
deprived of all parental rights, it must be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that the parent is unfit, abandoning, or 
substantially neglectful. However, In re 
J.P. was carefully limited to cases involving 
permanent termination of parental rights, 
and does not extend to cases involving cus-
tody disputes. 
[1] In another recent case, Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, Utah, 649 P.2d 38 (1982), this 
Court set out the standard to be applied in 
custody disputes. In Hutchison, we reaf-
firmed the position that a child's best inter-
ests are of paramount importance in a cus-
tody dispute, and that those interests are 
presumed to be most adequately served by 
granting custody to the natural parent. 
However, as stated in Hutchison, the paren-
tal presumption is not conclusive. 
[2] A party seeking to deprive a natural 
parent of custody of a minor child can rebut 
the parental presumption only by evidence 
establishing that: "no strong mutual bond 
exists, that the parent has not demonstrat-
ed a willingness to sacrifice his or her own 
interest and welfare for the child's, and 
that the parent lacks the sympathy for and 
understanding of the child that is character-
istic of parents generally." Only after the 
parental presumption has been rebutted, 
will the parties compete on equal footing, 
and custody shall then be granted to the 
JACOBSON v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INS. 
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party who will most adequately protect and 
promote the best interests of the child. For 
the factors that may be considered in deter-
mining the child's best interests, see Hut-
chison. 
[3] The standard applied by the trial 
court in the instant case is not in conformi-
ty with that adopted in Hutchison. The 
case is therefore remanded to the trial court 
with instructions to enter findings consist-
ent with the holding in Hutchison. Pend-
ing further disposition of this matter in the 
trial court, custody of the minor child shall 
remain with his natural father, the respon-
dent herein. 
No costs awarded. 
Gwen A. JACOBSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
KANSAS CITY LIFE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 17790. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 27, 1982. 
Personal representative of estate of in-
sured appealed summary judgment of the 
Sixth District Court, Sanpete County, 
George E. Ballif, J., dismissing action to re-
cover proceeds of temporary binder of life 
insurance. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that insurer was not liable under tem-
porary binder. 
Affirmed. 
Insurance <s=» 132(2) 
Insurer was not liable to personal rep-
resentative of estate of deceased insured 
under temporary life insurance binder 
where language on receipt governing tem-
porary life insurance policy clearly set forth 
requirement to complete a medical exami-
nation, insured was agent of defendant in-
surer and was aware of condition precedent 
but failed to complete medical examination 
before his death and insured's physician did 
not become an agent for insurer when he 
cashed sight draft sent by insurer so as to 
shift risk to insurer as doctor was indepen-
dently selected by insured to provide infor-
mation on insurance forms and was thereby 
responsible to him only. 
Lawrence E. Stevens, John B. Wilson of 
Parson, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
Ray R. Christensen of Christensen, Jen-
sen, Kennedy & Powell, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Gwen A. Jacobson, as personal 
representative of the estate of Rawlin Ja-
cobson, appeals a summary judgment which 
dismissed her action to recover the proceeds 
of a temporary binder of life insurance. 
The basis for the appeal is that the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as would 
preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
Rawlin Jacobson was president and chair-
man of the board of the Utah Independent 
Bank of Salina and president of the Bank 
of Ephraim. He was also an agent for 
defendant Kansas City Life Insurance Com-
pany and occasionally wrote life insurance 
policies covering persons taking out loans 
with his bank. 
In July, 1978, a public health nurse visit-
ed the Bank of Ephraim and took Mr. Ja-
cobson's blood pressure. She informed him 
that it was dangerously elevated and rec-
ommended that he consult a physician. On 
July 18, 1978, Dr. Bruce Harless examined 
Mr. Jacobson's eyes, ears, nose, throat, thy-
roid, heart and lungs, took his blood pres-
sure and performed a computer blood anal-
ysis. Although the blood pressure reading 
was high, Dr. Harless did not diagnose hy-
